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Central banks, which used to be so secretive, are communicating more and more these days 
about their monetary policy. This development has proceeded hand in glove with a 
burgeoning new scholarly literature on the subject. The empirical evidence, reviewed 
selectively here, suggests that communication can move financial markets, enhance the 
predictability of monetary policy decisions, and perhaps even help central banks achieve 
their goals. A number of theoretical drawbacks to greater communication are also reviewed 
here. None seems very important in practice. That said, no consensus has yet emerged 
regarding what constitutes “optimal” communication strategy—either in quantity or nature. 
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1. The background: Why communicate? 
Not long ago, central bankers thought it appropriate to shroud themselves in mystery 
and speak in tongues. For example, in 1981 Karl Brunner (1981, p. 5) wrote, with evident 
sarcasm, that: 
Central Banking… thrives on a pervasive impression that [it]… is an esoteric art. 
Access to this art and its proper execution is confined to the initiated elite. The 
esoteric nature of the art is moreover revealed by an inherent impossibility to 
articulate its insights in explicit and intelligible words and sentences. 
 
Fifteen years later, in my 1996 Robbins lectures at the London School of Economics, I 
expressed a view of what central bank communications should be—but wasn’t yet: 
Greater openness might actually improve the efficiency of monetary policy… 
[because] expectations about future central bank behavior provide the essential link 
between short rates and long rates. A more open central bank… naturally conditions 
expectations by providing the markets with more information about its own view of 
the fundamental factors guiding monetary policy…, thereby creating a virtuous 
circle. By making itself more predictable to the markets, the central bank makes 
market reactions to monetary policy more predictable to itself. And that makes it 
possible to do a better job of managing the economy. (Blinder (1998), pp. 70-72) 
 
A scant five years later, Michael Woodford (2001, pp. 307 and 312) assured an audience of 
central bankers assembled at the Federal Reserve’s famous Jackson Hole conference that: 
… successful monetary policy is not so much a matter of effective control of 
overnight interest rates… as of affecting… the evolution of market expectations... 
[Therefore,] transparency is valuable for the effective conduct of monetary policy… 
this view has become increasingly widespread among central bankers over the past 
decade. 
 
I’m sure Woodford overstated the case. But notice the sharp progression here: from 
Brunner’s 1981 lament about central bankers’ refusal to communicate, to Blinder’s 1996 
argument that more communication would enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy, to 
Woodford’s 2001 claims that the essence of monetary policy is the art of managing 2 
 
expectations and that this was already received wisdom. It is no exaggeration to call this a 
revolution in thinking. 
These new ideas from the academy had major impacts on actual central banking 
practice. Even the Federal Reserve, where then-Chairman Alan Greenspan once prided 
himself on “mumbling with great incoherence,” has been increasing its communicativeness 
incrementally since 1994. And the Fed is far from a leader in this regard. Indeed, one might 
argue that the European Central Bank (ECB) has been more transparent than the Fed ever it 
opened for business. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of England were 
early and enthusiastic converts to greater transparency and remain among the leaders in that 
regard, although Norges Bank and Sveriges Riksbank may now be in the vanguard. And 
there are many other examples. The attitudes that Brunner parodied have been resoundingly 
routed. 
Reasons for communication 
These remarkable strides in transparency have been powered by two principal 
rationales. One is the notion that greater central bank independence implies a greater need 
for democratic accountability, e.g., that independent central banks have a duty to explain 
both their actions and the thinking that underlies those actions. The second is the notion, 
exemplified by the Blinder and Woodford quotations above, that clearer communication 
enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy.  
While I have long been a strong advocate of both arguments, the scholarly literature 
focuses almost entirely on the second. Studies of how central bank communications create 
news focus, e.g., on how policy pronouncements influence expectations and therefore move 
asset prices. Studies of reducing noise focus, e.g., on how central bank talk increases the 3 
 
predictability of monetary policy, which should in turn reduce financial market volatility. In 
both cases, the central bank’s presumed objective is to raise the signal-to-noise ratio of 
monetary policy. 
That said, central bank talk can be done well or badly, and no one has yet formulated 
a set of clear principles (much yet clear practices) for “optimal” communication strategy, 
whatever that might mean.
1 Empirically, the key questions are whether communication 
contributes to the effectiveness of monetary policy by creating news (e.g., by moving short-
term interest rates in a desired way) and/or by reducing noise (e.g., by lowering market 
uncertainty).  
In their well-known survey, “How Do Central Banks Talk?,” Blinder et al. (2001, p. 
9) wrote that: “To date, there is no research to report on.” That is far from true today. An 
impressive number of mostly empirical studies of central bank communication have been 
conducted in this decade, and I will review some of their findings here.
2 Much of the new 
research focuses on the impacts of central bank communications on financial markets. The 
basic idea is simple: If communications steer expectations successfully, then (a) asset prices 
should react appropriately and (b) policy decisions should become more predictable. The 
empirical literature says, almost without exception, that both have happened. A second line 
of research tries to relate differences in communication strategies to differences in economic 
performance. For example, does announcing a numerical inflation target help anchor the 
public’s long-run inflation expectations? The answer seems to be a qualified yes.  
                                                 
1 See Blinder (2007) on how a central bank’s communications strategy should depend on the nature of its monetary 
policy committee. 
2 For much more detail, see Blinder et al. (forthcoming). 4 
 
But before reviewing some of these studies, it is worth pausing briefly to think 
theoretically about how and why central bank communication might enhance the 
effectiveness of monetary policy—and how it might fail. 
I start with an assertion that may seem surprising—until you think about it: There is 
no role whatsoever for monetary policy communication in what might be called the pure 
rational expectations paradigm. By this term, I mean the class of models in which the 
economic environment is stationary, expectations are rational, and the central bank is 
credibly committed to an unchanging policy rule. While these are patently unrealistic 
conditions, they do characterize a great many modern theoretical macro models. In such an 
idealized world, central bank communication is redundant because any systematic pattern in 
the way monetary policy is conducted would already have been correctly inferred (up to 
stochastic errors) from the bank’s observed behavior. Central bank talk would be not only 
cheap, but superfluous.  
The pure rational expectations paradigm is perhaps a straw man. But it does make a 
useful conceptual point: that any value from monetary policy communication must derive 
from (a) non-stationarities (the world and/or the central bank is changing), (b) lack of 
commitment to a policy rule (probably for good reasons), (c) poor understanding of the 
central bank’s policy rule (if one exists), or (d) non-rational expectations (which includes 
both information asymmetries and learning).
3 It should be clear that better central bank 
communication can influence each of the four items on this list. It should therefore also be 
clear that, once one escapes from the confines of the pure rational expectations paradigm, 
any analysis of monetary policy that ignores central bank communication is seriously 
                                                 
3 For example, Bernanke (2004) used the recent academic literature on adaptive learning to explain how the 
feedback effect of learning on the economy can lead to unstable or indeterminate outcomes—outcomes that effective 
central bank communication can help to avoid. See Orphanides and Williams (2004) and others. 5 
 
deficient. Indeed, if today’s overnight bank rate hardly matters, then managing expectations 
is the essence of monetary policy—as Woodford claimed.  
Limits to communication 
That said, poorly designed or poorly executed communications can do more harm 
than good. So it is not obvious that a central bank is always better off by saying more. In 
practice, central banks do limit their communications in a variety of ways. Internal 
deliberations are kept normally secret. Few central banks project the future path of their 
policy rate. (More on this later). Most observe a blackout or “purdah” period before each 
policy meeting. And I have called attention to the danger of creating a cacophony when a 
monetary policy committee (MPC) speaks with too many disparate voices (Blinder, 2004, 
Chapter 2). So, in principle, fuller communication might be undesirable or detrimental 
under some circumstances, as any competent theorist can surely prove. But theory, like talk, 
is cheap. The real question is: Are there empirically relevant arguments for limiting 
communication on monetary policy?
4  
One possible argument dates back to the seminal work of Cukierman and Meltzer 
(1986). Their case for obfuscation rested on two assumptions: that only unanticipated 
money matters, and that the central bank’s preferences are not precisely known by the 
public. Under these assumptions, a fully-transparent central bank cannot move real activity 
because it cannot create surprises. So some degree of opacity is essential to the effectiveness 
of monetary policy. However, Gosselin et al. (2007) recently pointed out that both the view 
that only unanticipated money matters and the idea that a central bank conceals its 
preferences in order to pursue its own agenda are increasingly anachronistic.  
                                                 
4 Other than a few obvious ones:  the need to preserve confidentiality, the fact that financial stability sometimes 
limits central bank talk, and the obvious point that no central bank can divulge what it does not know 6 
 
A central bank should perhaps be wary of talking about issues on which it receives 
noisy signals itself—such as the evolution of the economy (as opposed to, say, its upcoming 
interest rate decisions)—a point emphasized by Amato, Morris, and Shin (2002). If market 
participants defer too much to the wisdom of the central bank, it is even possible that more 
central bank communication could reduce welfare. But Svensson (2006a) pointed out that 
this argument holds only when central bank communications have a much lower signal-to-
noise ratio than private information—an implausible assumption in this context. 
Furthermore, if we focus on providing information about future monetary policy—as 
opposed to, say, forecasting the stock market or the exchange rate—there is an even simpler 
and more compelling objection to the Morris-Shin reasoning. Who, after all, knows more 
about the central bank’s intentions than the central bank itself? Thus honest central bank 
talk about prospective monetary policy is almost certain to coordinate beliefs in the right 
direction. 
Finally, if a cacophony problem arises from the fact that an MPC has too many 
uncoordinated and inconsistent voices that confuse rather than enlighten the public, the 
appropriate remedy is greater clarity, not silence. 
Communication is not precommitment 
Over the years, many central bankers and economists have occasionally confused 
communication with commitment—or worried out loud that the public might do so. 
Specifically, it has been agued that words uttered today might reduce the effectiveness of 
monetary policy by restricting the freedom to maneuver tomorrow. For example, then-
Chairman Paul Volcker defended the Fed’s refusal to announce its decisions immediately in 
1984 as follows: 7 
 
One danger in immediate release of the directive is that certain assumptions might be 
made that we are committed to certain operations that are, in fact, dependent on 




Echoing these sentiments in 1989, Alan Greenspan opposed immediate disclosure of the 
FOMC’s decisions because “a public announcement requirement also could impede timely 
and appropriate adjustments to policy.”
6 Yet, less than five years later, he voluntarily did 
precisely that. 
From today’s standpoint, the objections of Volcker and Greenspan to this minimalist 
disclosure proposal sound like throwbacks to the Stone Age. While there are cases in which 
statements do constrain future behavior—as in “giving a verbal commitment”—most central 
bank communication is not, or need not be, of this nature. In particular, the mere 
conveyance of information—about the policy decision, the inflation target, the forecast, 
etc.—does not commit the bank to any future action or inaction (although it might hint at 
such). Even the famous published “forward tracks” of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(discussed later), which are conditional forecasts of its own future behavior, are conditioned 
on many future variables.  
Of course, there may be times when a central bank wants to use words to commit 
itself—say, to manage expectations or to exploit the advantages of commitment (which are 
related). For example, Bernanke et al. (1999) argued in favor of inflation targeting precisely 
as a way to constrain central bank discretion. But that is the exception, not the rule. More 
important, it is volitional. Monetary policy communications need not entail any form of 
commitment unless the central bank wants it to.  
                                                 
5 Quoted in Goodfriend (1986), pp. 76-77. Goodfriend’s paper was an early, and at the time highly controversial, 
critique of the Federal Reserve’s secrecy—written by a Fed employee. 
6 Quoted in Blinder (1998), pp. 74-75. 8 
 
In sum, as compared to the apparently powerful conceptual arguments for why 
central bank communication should be expected to matter, and to be beneficial, the 
arguments against greater transparency appear to be thin gruel. We turn now from theory to 
practice. 
2. What to communicate 
Looking at real-world practices, two facts stand out. First, central banks with similar 
monetary policy objectives nonetheless communicate very differently. Second, 
communication policies at the same central bank change over time. Together, these two 
facts demonstrate that there is no accepted how-to-do-it manual for central bank 
communications. What, then, are some of the major choices? 
Central banks talk about at least four different aspects of monetary policy: their 
overall objectives and strategy, the motives behind a particular policy decision, the 
economic outlook, and future monetary policy decisions. I take them up in turn. 
Objectives and strategy 
Central bank communication is one useful way to inform the public about the 
objectives and strategies of monetary policy. An independent central bank should have a 
clearly-defined mandate. The Bank of England’s inflation target, for example, comes 
straight from the Chancellor and is very precise. Some central banks that are not assigned 
quantitative objectives by their governments, like the ECB, have nonetheless decided (or 
been directed) to provide their own quantification—as a way to facilitate accountability 
and/or to anchor expectations. These accountability and anchoring arguments figure 
prominently in the debate over inflation targeting (IT) because better and more open 
communication is often offered as one of the defining virtues of IT. Other central banks, 9 
 
like the Federal Reserve, have no explicit numerical targets.
7 However, few if any central 
banks announce a precise policy rule. Instead, private agents learn about the “rule”—really, 
the central bank’s average behavior pattern—by watching what the bank does and by 
listening to what it says. 
Policy decisions 
Almost all central banks nowadays inform the public about their monetary policy 
decisions immediately or with very short delays. However, this was not always the case. 
Prominently, the Federal Reserve only began announcing changes in its target federal funds 
rate immediately after FOMC meetings in February 1994. Before that, markets had to infer 
the intended funds rate from subsequent open-market operations--until the decision was 
published after the next FOMC meeting.  
Prompt and clear announcement of monetary policy decisions clearly creates news, 
but it also reduces noise by eliminating any guessing on the part of the public. So this type 
of central bank communication evidently raises the signal-to-noise ratio. We will see later 
that it also leads to improvements in the efficiency of monetary policy. 
Practices regarding what to say in the statement that accompanies the monetary 
policy decision differ enormously across central banks. One area of disagreement is over 
how much to disclose about the decisionmaking process itself, e.g., through the release of 
minutes and voting records. The ECB does not publish minutes and insists that it makes 
monetary policy decisions by unanimity. But it does hold press conferences. The Fed and 
the Bank of England (BoE) do release minutes (and both recently expedited their release), 
along with recorded votes. This information is particularly important for the BoE, whose 
                                                 
7 However, the Fed’s new practice of publishing three-year-ahead inflation forecasts can be (and has been) viewed 
as tacitly announcing an inflation target. It can also be viewed (but has not been) as stating an unemployment target. 10 
 
Monetary Policy Committee members are individually accountable. Interestingly, dissents 
on the British MPC are much more frequent than they are on the FOMC, where decisions 
are typically unanimous and dissent connotes fundamental disagreement.
8 
The economic outlook 
Central banks differ sharply in whether and how they communicate forward-looking 
information, including forecasts of future inflation, forecasts of future economic activity, 
and inclinations regarding future monetary policy. 
  Inflation-targeting central banks typically offer their assessments of expected future 
inflation in periodic inflation reports, sometimes using “fan charts” to display probability 
distributions. However, central banks that are not inflation targeters also often release (some 
aspects of) their inflation forecasts. In the case of the ECB, this is now done by publishing 
staff projections four times a year. These forecasts serve as inputs to the Governing 
Council’s discussions, but need not be endorsed by it—a very different role from inflation 
forecasts in an IT strategy. The Federal Reserve, curiously, keeps its staff projections secret. 
But it now publishes official FOMC forecasts of inflation four times a year. Its new three-
year-ahead inflation forecast effectively reveals the inflation target without calling it that. 
  Until recently, the diversity across central banks was even wider when it came to 
forecasting real output.  However, the Fed has now joined the Bank of England and the 
ECB in providing more frequent official output forecasts. A few central banks (including 
those of New Zealand, Norway, the Czech Republic, Sweden, and Hungary) even publish 
estimates of the output gap. 
 The path of future policy rates 
                                                 
8 On this point, see Chappell, McGregor and Vermilyea (2004) and Meade and Sheets (2005). 11 
 
Many central banks nowadays provide some sort of forward guidance regarding 
likely future policy decisions, albeit in very different ways. Some, such as the ECB, use 
indirect signals, often in the form of code words like “vigilance.” Other central banks are 
more explicit. FOMC statements, for example, sometimes (but not always) include an 
indication of where monetary policy is headed. At times, such as during the 2003–2005 
period, the FOMC has been quite direct about its expected future path of interest rates. 
A few central banks even provide quantitative guidance by publishing the numerical 
path of future policy rates that underlies their macroeconomic forecasts. Sweden and 
Iceland recently joined a small group that includes New Zealand and Norway in doing so. 
Some observers view forecasting its own future behavior as the last frontier of central bank 
transparency, and none of the major central banks have yet been willing to go that far. The 
issue remains controversial.
9   
Both Goodhart (2001) and Mishkin (2004) have argued against announcing a 
projected path for the policy rate on the grounds that it may complicate the committee’s 
decision-making process. It may also complicate communication with the public, which 
might fail to understand the conditional nature of the projection (Issing, 2005). In practice, 
the main concern holding back many central bankers may be that such communications 
could be mistaken for commitments. Then, if the projected developments do not materialize, 
any discrepancies between actual and previously-projected policy might damage the central 
bank’s credibility. In addition, while forward guidance by the central bank is intended to 
guide expectations, and thereby to reduce misallocations of resources, inaccurate forecasts 
might actually induce such misallocations, e.g., if agents make faulty economic decisions 
(such as taking on a mortgage) based on the central bank’s miscommunication.  
                                                 
9 For the case in favor, see Svensson (2006b) or Woodford (2005).  12 
 
To guard against these potential pitfalls, all central banks that provide forward 
guidance on interest rates emphasize that forward-looking assessments are always 
conditional on current information—and therefore subject to change. For example, the 
Riksbank regularly emphasizes the conditionality of its projected repo rate path by repeating 
the mantra: “It is a forecast, not a promise.” 
3. How to communicate 
Central banks can communicate in a wide variety of ways, and each chooses its own 
preferred methods.
10 This short section examines one particularly important decision, 
namely, the choice of sender (e.g., whether a signal is sent by the committee or by an 
individual committee member), which in turn may influence the precision of the signal. 
When signals are sent by or on behalf of the monetary policy committee, the appropriate 
content, timing, and channels must all be chosen. Communication by individuals raises 
further issues—such as whether one member (e.g., the chairman) should serve as 
spokesperson for the committee, reflecting a more collegial approach to communication, or 
each member should present his or her own views, representing an individualistic 
communication strategy.  
Communication by committees 
The most natural occasions for central bank communication come on MPC meeting 
days, when decisions are announced. But both the timing of this communication and the 
amount of detail it provides differ substantially across central banks. The Federal Reserve 
offers a short press release containing the decision, a concise (and typically stylized) 
explanation of its underlying reasoning, and often some forward guidance. The Bank of 
                                                 
10 See Blinder et al. (2001) for a detailed, though by now somewhat dated, account and explanation of the various 
instruments used by central banks. 13 
 
England’s press statement announces the decision, but normally provides an explanation 
only when interest rates have been changed or when its decision was unexpected.
11 
By contrast, the ECB not only releases a press statement with the policy decision, 
but also holds a press conference on meeting days--including a question and answer 
session.
12 Compared to the minutes of the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve, the ECB 
press conferences appear to be less detailed. But holding a televised press conference gets 
the news out faster, certainly to a broader audience, and probably more frankly. Perhaps 
most important, the Q&A sessions enable the press to clarify ambiguities by asking follow-
up questions. In a fascinating study, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) find that ECB press 
conferences have larger estimated effects on asset prices than its policy announcements do. 
Furthermore, these larger impacts come with smaller effects on volatility, clearly indicating 
a particularly high signal-to-noise ratio. 
Legal reporting requirements present another natural communication opportunity. 
For example, many central banks are obliged to provide annual reports and/or to testify 
before their legislatures. Among the most important of the reporting vehicles are regular 
publications such as the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, the Bank of England’s quarterly Inflation 
Report, and the Federal Reserve’s semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, 
which is presented along with the chairman’s congressional testimony. Each of these 
garners substantial press attention.  
                                                 
11 Somewhat later, but prior to the subsequent meeting, both the Fed and the BoE provide detailed accounts and 
explanations of the decisions in their minutes. And five years later, the Fed even releases verbatim transcripts of 
FOMC meetings. 
12 The central banks of the Czech Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland also 
hold regular press conferences. 14 
 
Communication by individual committee members  
Most central banks these days make decisions by committee, reflecting an apparent 
consensus that doing so leads to superior policy (Blinder, 2004, Chapter 2). But committees 
come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes. Blinder (2004) distinguishes among three types 
of committees—individualistic (examples: the Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank), 
genuinely collegial (examples: the ECB and the FOMC under Ben Bernanke), and 
autocratically collegial (examples: Norges Bank and the FOMC under Alan Greenspan). He 
emphasizes that these distinct committee types require different communication strategies. 
In the individualistic case, the diversity of views on the committee should be made apparent 
to the public, as a way to help markets and interested citizens understand the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding monetary policy making. But in the collegial case, a similar 
diversity of views, if made public, might undermine clarity and common understanding and 
create a cacophony instead. Therefore, communication should mainly convey the 
committee’s views. 
Since the importance of communicating individual views should reflect an MPC’s 
structure and functioning, it follows that it should vary both across banks and across time. 
Paradoxically, despite its collegial structure, the FOMC pursues a rather individualistic 
communication strategy, which sometimes produces highly diverse opinions that leave 
outside observers confused. The ECB, on the other hand, follows a far more collegial 
communication strategy, often displaying a much higher degree of consistency among the 
statements of individual committee members (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007b). 
One difference between communications by individuals and by committees is the 
greater flexibility in timing of the former. Committee communications are difficult to 15 
 
arrange other than at well-defined events. But changes in circumstances may not coincide 
with meeting dates or testimonies. When timeliness is important, speeches and interviews 
by individual committee members offer more flexible ways to communicate changes in the 
central bank’s views rapidly. But the large variation across central banks in their intensity of 
inter-meeting communication suggests that they differ greatly in how much importance they 
attach to speed.  
4. Short-term predictability: Impacts on financial markets 
The huge variability observed in central bank communication practices raises several 
obvious questions. First, are there better and worse ways to communicate? Second, while 
the clear trend toward more frequent and more open communication suggests that most 
central banks have decided that more communication is beneficial, are they right? Both of 
these are empirical questions to which I now turn. 
I begin with financial market reactions—which is where empirical investigators have 
concentrated, and not by coincidence. While central bank communications affect financial 
markets very quickly, interest rates and asset prices affect the rest of the economy only 
gradually—with the proverbial long and variable lags. Couple that with the many other 
factors that influence key macroeconomic variables, and isolating the macroeconomic 
effects of any particular communication event becomes next to impossible. But over the 
narrow time windows used in event studies, financial market variables arguably are reacting 
only, or at least mostly, to central bank signals. So it is much easier for an econometrician to 
estimate the impacts of central bank communications by using high-frequency data from 
financial markets than by using low-frequency data on macroeconomic performance. 16 
 
That is fine for researchers. But central bankers are probably much more concerned 
with long-term predictability. What really matters is whether the public develops a good 
understanding of the way the central bank thinks and operates. That is presumably what 
King (2000) had in mind when he stated provocatively that a central bank should be 
“boring.” It is certainly what Blinder (2004, p. 25) had in mind when he suggested that 
“perhaps the best a central bank can do is to ‘teach’ the markets its way of thinking.” 
Predicting the next monetary policy decision 
But because long-term predictability is so difficult to measure, most empirical 
studies focus on short-term predictability, that is, on the market’s ability to forecast the 
central bank’s next move. The typical tool is an event study of how financial market prices 
react to news about monetary policy. This body of research is now sizable, and it has 
established convincingly that the predictability of interest rate decisions has improved 
notably in recent years.  
The case of the Federal Reserve, which has periodically improved its transparency, 
has been studied most extensively. Poole and Rasche (2003) provide evidence that the 
surprise component of monetary policy decisions decreased considerably after the FOMC  
took the simple step of announcing its federal funds rate target immediately (starting in 
February 1994). Lange, Sack, and Whitesell (2003) show that the ability of Treasury bill 
yields to predict changes in the funds rate some months in advance has increased since the 
late 1980s. Swanson (2006) finds that U.S. financial markets and private sector forecasters 
have become both better able to forecast the funds rate at horizons out to several months 
and less uncertain about their forecasts ex ante--as indicated both by interest rate options 
and by the cross-sectional variance of interest rate forecasts. Since private sector forecasts 17 
 
of macroeconomic variables have not shown similar improvements, that evidence strongly 
suggests a specific effect of monetary policy communication, rather than just a general 
decline in macroeconomic volatility (“the Great Moderation”). Each of these authors argues 
that the Federal Reserve’s practice of making same-day announcements of monetary policy 
decisions was an important factor in reducing uncertainty. 
Particularly strong effects on interest-rate predictability should be expected when the 
authorities explicitly reveal their own expectations of future rate decisions. Unfortunately, 
no research yet analyzes the effects of the publication of quantitative forward guidance, as 
practiced for years by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RNBZ) and, more recently, by 
Norges Bank and Sveriges Riksbank. There is simply not enough data yet. But as more 
experience is accumulated, e.g., in Norway and Sweden, this will be a high priority area for 
future research. 
A different type of forward-looking communication has attracted far more scholarly 
attention: the qualitative guidance provided by the Federal Reserve (and other central 
banks) that issue “bias” or “balance of risks” statements. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the 
predictive power of these statements for future monetary policy seems to be modest. 
In the case of the Fed, it is important to distinguish between bias statements made 
before and after May 1999. Until that date, FOMC policy directives were internal 
declarations of intent, presumably focused narrowly on the inter-meeting period, and made 
public only after the next FOMC meeting. Even insiders were often confused about what 
they meant. For example, the transcript of the July 1994 FOMC meeting contains the 18 
 
following humorous interchange, which illustrates how a newcomer to the committee 
struggled with the meaning of a so-called asymmetric directive:
13 
MS. MINEHAN: … Just being new to this whole business, if we go asymmetric, what does that 
really mean? 
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN: We don’t have a specific formulation. Asymmetry merely means a 
general sense of the Committee’s disposition or the direction of our bias. 
MS. MINEHAN: How long should we expect you to wait before making a change? 
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN: No, I have tried to articulate this and I have been much too specific, 
so I’ll call on Don Kohn. [Laughter] 
Donald Kohn, then the director of the Fed’s Division of Monetary Affairs, and Greenspan then both 
tried to explain the meaning of asymmetry. After some confusing discussion, William McDonough, 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, interjected a question: 
VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH: Is that fully clear to you? 
MS. MINEHAN: Yes, I am really clear on this. [Laughter] 
Despite the muddled message, the pre-1999 bias has been shown to be a statistically 
significant predictor of the likelihood and direction of changes in the fed funds target during 
the subsequent inter-meeting period (Lapp and Pearce 2000), but not thereafter (Thornton 
and Wheelock 2000). Since May 1999, however, the balance-of-risks assessments have 
been external information provided to the markets. And Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007c), 
focussing on this period, find them to be consistent with subsequent interest rate moves. 
Pakko (2005) takes a different approach to the same question. Starting with the usual 
Taylor-rule variables for the Fed’s reaction function, he asks whether the content of the 
“bias” statements is a statistically significant additional variable predicting changes in the 
                                                 
13 Cathy Minehan, then the new President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, was attending her first meeting as 
a member of the FOMC. These words are excerpted from a longer passage quoted in Blinder et al. (2001), p. 69. 19 
 
funds rate. His answer is yes. Pakko’s approach has also been applied to the ECB, though 
with mixed results.
14  
Which forms of central bank communication matter? 
The evidence culled from various event studies demonstrates that central bank 
statements and/or speeches quickly filter into financial market prices. The seminal study by 
Kohn and Sack (2004) found that both FOMC statements and Greenspan testimonies moved 
markets, but that Greenspan speeches did not. Reeves and Sawicki (2007) find similar 
evidence for Bank of England communications. However, some other studies (e.g., 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b)) find significant effects of speeches on financial markets, 
perhaps due to different procedures for selecting communication events.  
A comprehensive study of different communication tools in six different central 
banks by Connolly and Kohler (2004) finds that monetary policy reports in Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the US provide information that significantly affects markets’ 
expectations, and thus interest rate futures. Parliamentary hearings affect futures rates in 
Australia, New Zealand, the UK (albeit only marginally), and the US, but not in Canada or 
the euro area. However, where they have effects, the impacts of hearings on interest rate 
expectations are the largest among the various communication tools. 
Central banks often provide substantially more detailed follow-up explanations of 
their decisions in the minutes of policy meetings. But if the minutes are to provide 
meaningful news to financial markets, they must be released before the committee’s next 
meeting. In recent years, both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have shortened 
the lag in releasing their minutes, moving it from after to before the subsequent meeting. 
                                                 
14 Rosa and Verga (2007) find that ECB communications add information to Taylor-type rules, but Jansen and De 
Haan (2006) do not. 20 
 
Both Reinhart and Sack (2006) and Reeves and Sawicki (2007) find discernable financial 
market reactions only with more timely release.  
Clarity and uncertainty in central bank communication 
Central bank communications are rarely known for their sparkling prose—or even 
for their clarity. Since clearer communications presumably have higher signal-to-noise 
ratios, they should in principle convey more information. A few fascinating studies suggest 
that they do. 
Fracasso, Genberg, and Wyplosz (2003) develop three subjective indicators of the 
quality of inflation reports in 19 countries and find that higher quality reports are associated 
with smaller policy surprises. Jansen (2008) supports their findings. Using objective 
measures of readability to measure the clarity of the Federal Reserve chairman’s semi-
annual Humphrey-Hawkins testimonies, he finds that greater clarity often reduces the 
volatility of interest rates. Finally, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) exploit the fact that 
ECB press conferences normally follow ECB policy announcements with a 45-minute lag to 
show that press conferences have larger average effects on asset prices and smaller effects 
on volatility—which indicates a higher signal-to-noise ratio of press conference 
communications. Why? They suggest that the Q&A session enables journalists to ask 
clarifying questions. 
While the clarity issue has received scant attention in the literature, I find it 
tantalizing that three studies with such different methodologies all come to the same 
conclusion: that greater clarity enhances the quality of central bank communication. 
Unclear communication is one source of uncertainty in central bank communication. 
But it is not the only source. Inconsistent signals can also arise when different members of a 21 
 
monetary policy committee convey different messages—whether intentionally (e.g., by 
conducting a debate in public) or unintentionally (e.g., via uncoordinated communication). 
As Blinder (2007, p. 114) notes, “A central bank that speaks with a cacophony of voices 
may, in effect, have no voice at all.”  
On the other hand, Bernanke (2004) argues that “the willingness of FOMC members 
to present their individual perspectives in speeches and other public forums provides the 
public with useful information about the diversity of views and the balance of opinion on 
the Committee.” Both views have validity. Whether communicating individual committee 
members’ views to the public enlightens or confuses is ultimately an empirical issue. And 
whether it is advisable or inadvisable depends, inter alia, on whether the committee has 
group or individual accountability.  
  While FOMC members sometimes speak with disparate voices, the ECB generally 
speaks more with a single voice.
15 However, was not always the case. Jansen and De Haan 
(2006) show that communication about monetary policy inclinations by individual members 
of the Governing Council was relatively high in the initial years of the ECB, but then 
declined over time.  
Do more consistent communication practices improve the predictability of monetary 
policy? Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007d) find that more dispersed communication on 
Federal Reserve monetary policy is associated with less predictable policy decisions at 
short- and medium-term horizons, and that the magnitude of this effect is large. There is 
also evidence that the voting records of the Bank of England’s MPC members help predict 
future policy changes (Gerlach-Kristen, 2004). Casting a minority vote appears to be a 
                                                 
15 Issing (1999) has justified this on the basis of the ECB’s special supranational nature. 22 
 
bigger step, and therefore carries more information, than merely expressing a personal 
dissenting view in public. 
Of course, markets will adapt to any central bank communication style. When 
central banks emit relatively dispersed, or even conflicting, signals, financial markets will 
attempt to identify pivotal committee members and attach more weight to their statements. 
For example, Andersson et al. (2006) find that markets react more strongly to statements by 
the Riksbank’s governor. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) show the same for the Fed 
chairman. But in the case of the more collegial ECB, they find that markets react more 
equally to statements by all members of the Governing Council. 
  Importantly (but largely ignored), central bank communication must have both a 
transmitter and a receiver, and uncertainty or confusion can emanate from either end. On the 
receiving end, the same message might be interpreted differently by different listeners, who 
may have different expectations or believe in different models. One example is provided by 
Fracasso et al. (2003) who, using survey data, show that the same inflation report is 
perceived differently by different respondents, and that interest rate surprises tend to 
increase with the divergence in perceptions. In another example, De Haan, Amtenbrink, and 
Waller (2004) find substantial differences between newspaper reports published the day 
after ECB policy decisions in the Financial Times (FT) and the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ). The British-based FT is critical of the ECB’s money growth “pillar” and 
tends to pay relatively little attention to it. But the home-town FAZ, which believes that 
money should play a prominent role in the ECB’s strategy, gives that pillar substantial 
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5. Longer-term predictability: Anchoring inflation expectations  
As noted earlier, the long lags in monetary policy and the myriad influences on 
macroeconomic outcomes make it virtually impossible to isolate specific effects of a 
particular communication event on, say, inflation. So this section takes a longer-term 
perspective by summarizing the empirical literature on how (if at all) different 
communication strategies influence actual and expected inflation. Specifically, a number of 
studies have assessed the effects of an explicit numerical inflation target on inflation 
outcomes. The central questions are whether a numerical inflation objective (a) anchors the 
public’s long-run inflation expectations, (b) reduces inflation forecast errors, and (c) reduces 
inflation. 
One major finding (or rather anti-finding) in this literature is that comparisons 
between inflation targeters and a control group of non-targeters are enormously sensitive to 
the choice of the control group (see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007)). One reason 
might be the following potentially serious endogeneity problem: Just ask yourself whether 
the adoption of IT reduces inflation, or whether the desire to reduce inflation induces a 
country to adopt IT.  
Subject to these very major caveats, a number of studies, using different methods, do 
find that IT successfully anchors inflation expectations. One approach is due to Johnson 
(2003), who first estimates the determinants of expected inflation (π
e) in the period before 
inflation targeting, and then uses that estimated model to predict π
e under the IT regime. 
The difference between actual and predicted π
e is then interpreted as the effect of the 
institutional change. Using this method, he estimates large reductions in expected inflation 24 
 
after the announcement of inflation targets in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden, 
but not in the United Kingdom. 
A second approach compares targeting to non-targeting countries. Controlling for 
country, year, trend inflation, and business-cycle effects, Johnson (2002) detects a reduction 
in inflationary expectations in the IT countries but not in the control group. Levin, 
Natalucci, and Piger (2004) provide evidence that long-term inflation forecasts exhibit 
strong correlation with a three-year moving average of actual inflation in the control group, 
but not in the IT group--suggesting that inflation-targeting central banks have successfully 
de-linked expectations from realized inflation.  
A third approach uses index-linked bonds to derive measures of long-term inflation 
expectations. Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006) show that the implied break-even 
inflation rate is less responsive to both incoming macroeconomic data and monetary policy 
announcements in Sweden and the United Kingdom, two IT countries, than it is in the 
United States, which has no explicit inflation target.  
All that said, a number of authors find that inflation expectations are equally well 
anchored in non-targeting countries, which casts doubt on whether the effect identified in 
other studies is really causal. For example, Castelnuovo, Nicoletti-Altimari, and Palenzuela 
(2003) find that long-term inflation expectations are well-anchored in all countries in their 
sample except Japan—regardless of whether the central bank has an inflation target, a 
quantitative definition of price stability, or no quantified target at all. 
What about the behavior of inflation itself, as opposed to that of expected inflation? 
Does the introduction of IT reduce the average level of inflation—which was certainly the 
intent of its inventors in New Zealand and most (if not all) of its early adopters? 25 
 
Surprisingly, Ball and Sheridan (2005) find no empirical evidence that inflation targeting 
improves inflation performance in a cross section of countries, once you control for 
regression to the mean. (High inflation tends to come down.) They offer the endogeneity 
issue mentioned earlier as an explanation: Countries that adopted IT had above-average 
inflation prior to adoption. Willard (2006), after dealing with the endogeneity problem in a 
variety of ways, supports Ball and Sheridan’s conclusions. But other studies (e.g., Vega and 
Winkelried (2005)) do not. 
What are we to make of these disparate results? As noted, Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2007) emphasize the importance of the control group. There appears to be no 
systematic difference in the inflation performances of successful countries with and without 
explicit inflation targets. The main benefit they see in inflation targeting is as a disciplinary 
device that helps potentially wayward countries move closer to the performance of the 
successful group.  
6. So what do we really know (and not know)? 
The empirical evidence reviewed here is not entirely one-sided. But it certainly 
points strongly in one direction. It seems safe to conclude that communication is an 
important and powerful part of the central bank’s toolkit. Central bank talk clearly can move 
financial markets and improve the predictability of monetary policy. With very few 
exceptions, the research to date suggests that more and better central bank communication 
has succeeded in both “reducing noise” and “creating news.” It may also help the monetary 
authorities achieve lower and more stable inflation, although here the findings are—perhaps 
necessarily—much less clear. All that said, the usefulness of monetary policy signals can be 26 
 
degraded if the central bank speaks with too many conflicting voices—as sometimes 
happens at the Federal Reserve, for example. 
I have mentioned that no consensus has yet emerged on what constitutes “optimal” 
communication policies, nor on how that choice depends on the institutional environment, 
the nature of the central bank’s decisionmaking process, and the structure of its monetary 
policy committee. Practices, in fact, differ substantially and continue to evolve. While 
central banks clearly must tailor their communication strategies to these and other 
institutional features, thinking on that important topic has barely begun. 
The research reviewed here, and in much greater detail in Blinder et al. 
(forthcoming) constitutes a quantum leap over what we knew at the start of the decade, 
which was virtually nothing. But there is a lot more to learn. As one prominent example, 
consider the publication of projected paths for the central bank’s policy rate. While this 
practice appears to be the “new frontier” in central bank communication, it has existed in so 
few countries for so few years that we have little empirical knowledge of its effects as yet. 
As more data accumulates, this should be a high-priority area for future research. 
Finally, virtually all the research to date focuses on central bank communication 
with the financial markets. It may be time to pay some attention to communication with the 
general public. Admittedly, studying communication with the general public poses new and 
difficult challenges to researchers—not least because financial market prices are far less 
useful. But the issues are at least as important. In the end, central banks derive their 
democratic legitimacy, and hence their cherished independence, from the consent of the 
general public. 
7. Toward optimal central bank communication policies 27 
 
I switch now from the comparatively safe domain of positive analysis to the 
inherently more dangerous domain of normative prescription. I do so with some trepidation 
because, as I have emphasized repeatedly, when it comes to central bank communications 
policy, one size (or shape) certainly does not fit all. This concluding section is therefore 
intended more to spur debate than to provide definitive answers. 
Given what we know now about the effects of central bank communications, what 
policies might be thought of as “best practice”? 
To begin on what seems to be safe quantitative grounds, I would judge that no 
central bank on earth currently communicates too much information, and that many 
communicate too little. Whether judged by the need for democratic accountability or by the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, the central banks of Norway and Sweden may now be the 
gold standard, and aspiring to their level of transparency may not be bad advice for the 
laggards.  
Turning to specifics, it is hard to understand what purpose (other than deliberate 
obfuscation) is served by being less than fully transparent about the central bank’s 
objectives, including posting a numerical  inflation target (whether a point or a range). 
Notice that, if the bank has a dual mandate, revealing the objectives is not equivalent to 
inflation targeting. Notice also that the rhetoric of some inflation-targeting central banks, 
which focuses so single-mindedly on inflation, does not match their observed behavior, 
which also displays concern with, say, output gaps.
16 That, to me, is miscommunication and 
lack of transparency. 
The statement that accompanies each monetary policy decision poses more delicate 
issues, since “optimal statement policy” must depend on the nature of the decisionmaking 
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body. Briefly, a sole decisionmaker (e.g., New Zealand) should be able to release a lengthy 
and coherent explanation of both the decision and the reasons behind it right away. At the 
other end of the spectrum, an individualistic MPC (e.g., the UK) may be incapable of doing 
so in such a short time frame; indeed, the members may not even have agreed on the 
decision, much less on its rationale. In such cases, meaningful explanations must wait for 
the minutes, which should therefore be published as quickly as possible. Genuinely-
collegial committees (e.g., the ECB and perhaps the Fed) are somewhere in between.  
The case for public release of the central bank’s forecast (possibly excluding the 
interest-rate forecast; see the next paragraph) also seems clear. Understanding the forecast 
on which the decision is based is an indispensible component of understanding the rationale 
for the decision itself. But here an operational issue arises for the overwhelming majority of 
central banks that make decisions by committee: Should it be the MPC’s forecast or the 
staff’s forecast that is released? My suggested answer is simple. If the discussions at MPC 
meetings are based on the committee’s forecasts, then that is the one to release. If not, the 
bank should release the staff forecast. And I don’t see why this information cannot be 
released with the statement. After all, forecasts obsolesce quickly. 
But should the publicly-released forecast include the central bank’s forecast of its 
own future behavior—the expected future path of the policy rate? As indicated earlier, this 
is a ticklish issue on which opinions vary. The experience of New Zealand, Norway, and 
Sweden demonstrates that doing so is feasible. The Swedish experience, though still brief, 
demonstrates that it can even be done with an individualistic committee, which might have 
seemed implausible on its face. On the other hand, forecasting the future of the policy rate 
would require major changes in the modi operandi of many central banks. So this last 29 
 
transparency frontier may have to remain part of the aspiration level for most central banks 
for a while. While they are waiting, publishing interest rate forecasts from a reaction 
function estimated (or concocted) by the staff, but not necessarily “owned” by the MPC, 
seems a good compromise. 
Who should speak for the MPC? The right answer here seems straightforward 
enough. Genuinely collegial committees should make every effort to avoid the cacophony 
problem by speaking with (as close as possible to) one voice. That could mean that only the 
chairman speaks for the committee, or that everyone may speak but adheres to a common 
message. On individualistic committees, however, multiple independent voices are essential 
and should not be suppressed. 
Some evidence, though still thin in volume, suggests that clearer communications 
are more effective—a finding that implies some obvious advice to central bankers who may 
still like to be cryptic. (Remember, Karl Brunner!) In addition, the study that found more 
market impact from ECB press conferences than from ECB statements suggests that holding 
a press conference may be a particularly good way to communicate. 
By now, I must surely have given my discussants plenty to which to object. I look 
forward to their reactions. 30 
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